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_____________ 
 
No. 13-1944 
_____________ 
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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 
                         Respondent  
 
     
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No.:  A077-045-577) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Walter A. Durling  
     
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 3, 2014 
 
(Opinion filed: March 20, 2014) 
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O P I N I O N 
   
 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Petitioner George Acupanda Cadapan, a native and 
citizen of the Philippines and a lawful permanent resident of 
the United States, petitions for review of the decision by the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) finding him 
removable for having been convicted of an “aggravated 
felony” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). He argues that his conviction under 
the Pennsylvania indecent assault statute, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
3126(a)(7), does not qualify as an aggravated felony under 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). For the reasons 
that follow, we disagree. Cadapan also contends that he was 
never admitted to the United States and that therefore he is 
not removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which 
applies to “an alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony 
at any time after admission.” Cadapan, however, never raised 
this argument before the BIA. Because he failed to exhaust 
his administrative remedies, we lack jurisdiction over this 
claim. We will deny Cadapan’s petition.  
I. 
 On August 31, 2011, following a jury trial in the Court 
of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, 
Cadapan was convicted of three offenses: (1) indecent assault 
with a person less than 13 years of age, in violation of 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 3126(a)(7); (2) indecent assault without consent, 
in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3126(a)(1); and (3) 
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corruption of minors, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
6301(a)(1). On November 29, 2011, Cadapan was sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment not less than 6 months nor more 
than 23 months; a term of imprisonment of not less than 3 
months nor more than 23 months, to run concurrently; and 
supervised probation for 36 months, respectively. On April 
11, 2012, Cadapan was granted parole by the Court of 
Common Pleas. He was transferred to the custody of the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) the next day.  
 
 DHS charged Cadapan with removability pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien who, after admission, 
was convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(A) – specifically, sexual abuse of a minor. 
DHS also charged Cadapan with removability under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), as an alien convicted of a crime of child 
abuse based on his conviction for the corruption of minors 
under Pennsylvania law. Cadapan conceded removability on 
the latter charge but denied the aggravated felony charge.
1
 He 
argued that the Pennsylvania statute for indecent assault 
encompassed conduct that could not be considered sexual 
abuse of a minor under the federal statute. In an oral decision, 
the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) rejected this argument and 
concluded that Cadapan was removable on both grounds. The 
BIA subsequently dismissed Cadapan’s appeal.  
                                              
1
 As noted by the BIA, even though Cadapan conceded his 
removability based on his conviction for a crime of child 
abuse, the aggravated felony issue remained relevant because 
of its impact on his eligibility for relief from removal and his 
ability to re-immigrate to the United States after removal. 
(See App. 3.) 
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II.  
 We have jurisdiction over only one of the two claims 
Cadapan raises on appeal because the other is unexhausted.
2
 
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (stating that a court may review a 
final order of removal only if “the alien has exhausted all 
administrative remedies”). For the first time, Cadapan argues 
that the BIA erred in ordering him removed as an alien who 
had been admitted to the United States, see 8 U.S.C.                  
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), because he was never admitted to the 
United States.
3
 He concedes that he never raised this 
particular issue before the IJ or BIA. We have held that “[t]he 
exhaustion requirement attaches to each particular issue 
raised by the petitioner.” Castro v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 
365 (3d Cir. 2012). Therefore, Cadapan’s argument regarding 
whether or not he was ever “admitted” to the United States is 
unexhausted and we lack jurisdiction to consider it.  
 
 Cadapan’s second argument, however, is properly 
before this Court. The INA defines an aggravated felony as, 
inter alia, a conviction for “murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a 
minor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). Cadapan argues that 
conduct that meets the federal definition of sexual abuse of a 
minor is not necessary for a conviction under the 
Pennsylvania statute for indecent assault. He therefore argues 
                                              
2
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).   
3
 Cadapan claims that he only entered the United States once 
as a crewman traveling with a C1 visa. He states that even 
though he later adjusted to lawful permanent resident status, 
he was never “admitted” to this country.  
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that he did not commit an aggravated felony. For the 
following reasons we disagree.  
 
 Because the BIA issued its own opinion, we review its 
decision rather than that of the IJ. See Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 
F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005). We review the decision of the 
IJ, however, to the extent that the BIA deferred to or adopted 
the IJ’s reasoning. See Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 
515 (3d Cir. 2006).  Our review of legal questions is de novo, 
subject to the principles of deference articulated in Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 844 (1984). See Catwell v. Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 
199, 205 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
 We apply the categorical approach in determining 
whether Cadapan’s conviction constitutes sexual abuse of a 
minor under the INA. See Restrepo v. Att’y Gen., 617 F.3d 
787, 791 (3d Cir. 2010). We proceed in two steps: “first, we 
must ascertain the definition for sexual abuse of a minor, and 
second we must compare this ‘federal’ definition to the state 
statutory offense in question.” Id. If conduct meeting the 
federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor is necessary for a 
conviction under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3126(a)(7), then 
Cadapan’s conviction under the statute “qualifies as a 
conviction for sexual abuse of a minor and, by extension, an 
aggravated felony for which he is removable.” Id.  
 
 The BIA and IJ properly turned to 18 U.S.C. § 
3509(a)(8) as “a guide in identifying the types of crimes we 
would consider to be sexual abuse of minor” under 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(A). Id. at 796 n.10 (quoting Matter of Rodriguez-
Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991, 996 (BIA 1999)). In 
Restrepo, we determined that Chevron deference was 
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appropriate with respect to the BIA’s definition of sexual 
abuse of a minor.  617 F.3d at 796. We therefore adopted the 
BIA’s approach in Matter of Rodriguez-Rodriguez, which 
was to use § 3509(a)(8) as a reference point for what should 
be considered sexual abuse of a minor. Id. We noted that such 
an approach was reasonable because the definition set forth in 
§ 3509(a)(8) was consistent with “the commonly accepted 
definition of ‘sexual abuse’” in Black’s Law Dictionary. Id. 
We also noted that Congress had intended to incorporate a 
broad range of state crimes under the umbrella of “sexual 
abuse of a minor.” Id. at 798.  
 
 Section 3509(a)(8) defines sexual abuse as “the 
employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or 
coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to 
engage in, sexually explicit conduct or the rape, molestation, 
prostitution, or other form of sexual exploitation of children, 
or incest with children.” 18U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8). 
Pennsylvania’s statute for indecent assault provides, in 
relevant part, that: 
 
A person is guilty of indecent assault if the 
person has indecent contact with the 
complainant, causes the complainant to have 
indecent contact with the person or intentionally 
causes the complainant to come into contact 
with seminal fluid, urine or feces for the 
purpose of arousing sexual desire in the person 
or the complainant and . . . (7) the complainant 
is less than 13 years of age.  
 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3126(a)(7). The BIA held that conduct 
covered by the Pennsylvania statute categorically qualifies as 
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“molestation” or “sexual exploitation” of a child within the 
meaning of  18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8). (See App. 4.) 
 
 Cadapan mischaracterizes the BIA’s decision, stating 
that the agency “incorrectly concluded that one type of sexual 
abuse—‘molestation’—necessarily encompasses all conduct 
prohibited by Subsection (a)(7) of Pennsylvania’s indecent 
assault statute.” Appellant’s Br. 16. He neglects the BIA’s 
finding that the conduct also could be considered another 
“form of sexual exploitation of children.” 18 U.S.C. § 
3509(a)(8). Instead, Cadapan focuses on the decision of the 
IJ, which stated that under a modified categorical approach, 
all conduct falling under the “indecent contact” portion of the 
Pennsylvania statute (the portion of the statute under which 
Cadapan was convicted) qualifies as “molestation.”4 Cadapan 
                                              
4
 The modified categorical approach is unnecessary in this 
case even though the indecent assault statute is divisible 
because all of the conduct covered by the statute constitutes 
sexual abuse of a minor. See United States v. Jones, 740 F.3d 
127, 134 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that modified categorical 
approach is only appropriate where divisible state statute 
proscribes some conduct that falls under umbrella of federal 
statute and some that does not). The IJ erred in holding that 
the portion of the Pennsylvania statute involving “contact 
with seminal fluid, urine or feces” does not constitute sexual 
abuse of a minor. In Stubbs v. Attorney General, we held that 
in order for a conviction to be classified as “sexual abuse of a 
minor,” “a past act with a child must have actually occurred.” 
452 F.3d 251, 256 (3d Cir. 2006). We concluded that because 
a New Jersey statute proscribing “engag[ing] in sexual 
conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of a 
child” did not necessarily involve a past act with a child, 
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argues that the IJ improperly employed the Black’s Law 
Dictionary definition of molestation and that the IJ should 
have employed the definition provided in Rule 414 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. He says that the definition of 
molestation provided in Rule 414 is narrower and does not 
include all conduct which would be considered “indecent 
contact” under the Pennsylvania statute. In particular, 
Cadapan notes that “indecent contact” may include touching 
of “the backs of the legs . . . shoulders, neck, and back.” 
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 47 A.3d 155, 158 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2012). In contrast, under Rule 414, there must be touching of 
“the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks.” 
18 U.S.C. § 2246(3).
5
 Consequently, he argues that 
Cadapan’s conviction does not constitute sexual abuse of a 
minor or, by extension, an aggravated felony.  
 
 As an initial matter, we agree with the BIA that 
conduct covered by the indecent assault statute categorically 
                                                                                                     
convictions under it did not categorically constitute sexual 
abuse of a minor. Id. at 255 (citation omitted). Here, 
“intentionally caus[ing] the complainant to come in contact 
with the seminal fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of 
arousing sexual desire in a person or a complainant,” 
necessarily involves a past act with a child. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 3126(a)(7). The IJ erred in concluding otherwise. The BIA 
properly determined that this portion of the indecent assault 
statute categorically qualifies as sexual exploitation, and by 
extension sexual abuse of a minor.  
5
 Rule 414 cross-references this section of the U.S. Code. See 
Fed. R. Evid. 414.  
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constitutes “other form[s] of sexual exploitation” of a child.6 
18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8). On this issue alone, Cadapan’s 
petition could be dismissed. We also agree, however, that 
molestation includes all conduct covered by “indecent 
contact.” Cadapan does not explain why we must look to the 
Federal Rules of Evidence for the definition of molestation. It 
is not cross-referenced in § 3509(a)(8) and generally when a 
statutory term is left undefined, we give it its “ordinary 
meaning” or common usage. United States v. Santos, 553 
U.S. 507, 511 (2008). In ascertaining the ordinary meaning of 
terms, we may refer to legal dictionaries. Pa. Dep’t of Pub. 
Welfare v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 647 F.3d 
506, 511 (3d Cir. 2011). Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
“molestation,” in part as “[t]he act of making unwanted and 
indecent advances to or on someone, esp[ecially] for sexual 
gratification.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1096 (9th ed. 2009). 
As the IJ concluded, this definition encompasses all conduct 
constituting “indecent contact” under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
3126(a)(7).  While Cadapan is correct that the Supreme Court 
has held that ambiguous “criminal statutes referenced by the 
INA must be construed in the noncitizen’s favor,” here, there 
is no ambiguity. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 
(2013). Moreover, § 3509(a)(8) is not actually referenced in 
the INA and we have held that it is merely a guide as to what 
constitutes sexual abuse of a minor. We conclude, therefore, 
that the BIA reasonably determined that the “indecent 
                                              
6 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “sexual exploitation” as 
“[t]he use of a person, esp[ecially] a child, in prostitution, 
pornography, or other sexually manipulative activity that has 
caused or could cause serious emotional injury.” Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1498-99 (9th ed. 2009). All conduct proscribed by 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3126(a)(7) meets this definition.  
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contact” referred to in the indecent assault statute 
categorically constitutes molestation and, by extension, 
sexual abuse of a minor. Cadapan is removable as an 
aggravated felon under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Cadapan’s 
petition for review.   
  
 
 
 
